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Bulgarian-Russian games in the energy sector: 
an outcome is getting closer
Tomasz Dąborowski
Bulgaria and Russia are entering the final phase of setting the conditions 
of their co-operation in the energy sector. A new gas contract is being nego-
tiated because the currently applicable agreements will have expired by the 
end of 2012. The fate of two major energy projects – whose implementa-
tion depends on good co-operation between Sofia and Moscow: the Burgas– 
–Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the construction of a Bulgarian nuclear po-
wer plant in Belene with Russian participation – is currently being decided. 
Another issue ever-present on the agenda is the future of the South Stream 
gas pipeline promoted by Russia, which is to run through Bulgarian territory. 
The outcome of all the aforementioned discussions and negotiations will deter-
mine for years the model of Bulgarian-Russian relations and may strongly affect 
the shape of the oil, gas and electricity markets in South-Eastern Europe. 
Bulgarian-Russian talks on co-operation in the energy sector are taking place in a confrontatio-
nal atmosphere and have not brought about any binding results as yet. This lengthy deadlock 
in energy relations between the two countries is a consequence of a serious conflict of inte-
rests. Russian policy towards Bulgaria is dependent on Moscow’s strategic goals: the desire to 
maintain its position of a key supplier of fuels to Europe and to enter the EU’s nuclear energy 
market. Without Bulgaria, the implementation of the infrastructural projects which Russia has 
been pushing through in South-Eastern Europe would be challenged. In turn, Bulgaria is trying 
to capitalise on its strategic location and build more partnership-based relations with Russia 
and to benefit as much as possible from its participation in the projects put forward by Moscow. 
Therefore, it is interested in the implementation of large energy projects, but not at any pri-
ce. Furthermore, improvement of gas security is becoming a matter of increasing priority for 
Bulgaria. It has become aware of its need to diversify the sources and routes of gas supply 
as a consequence of the gas crisis, which unfolded at the beginning of 2009. 
The lack of consensus on the large-scale energy projects and the increasingly frequent fric-
tion seem to indicate that the ‘rough friendship’ between Russia and Bulgaria will probably 
be sustained. However, as regards the future of the large-scale energy projects, the most 
likely scenario is the one which sees the enhancement of co-operation between the two 
countries in the nuclear sector. This will increase Russia’s role on the electric energy market 
in South-Eastern Europe. No change is expected in the existing bilateral co-operation in the 
oil sector. The future of the South Stream project is the most difficult to predict because 
of its vast scale and the fact that Russia and Bulgaria are not the only players on which it 
depends. Nevertheless, Bulgaria will gradually lessen its dependence on Russia in the gas 
sector. However, it will take few years before this happens. 
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Bulgaria’s energy dependence on Russia
Bulgaria has a relatively well-organised energy balance (see Appendix 1). The main source 
of its energy is coal (36%), followed by oil and petroleum products (a total of 24%), nuc-
lear energy (21%), natural gas (12%) and renewable energy sources (6.5%). Almost all of 
its imported oil, natural gas and nuclear fuel originates from Russia. Furthermore, Russian 
companies are major players on the Bulgarian oil market, as well as important for gas and 
nuclear sector in Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria imports natural gas (between 2.5 and 3 billion m3 annually) only from Russia. Sup-
plies are made with the agency of three companies: (a) the Russian-Bulgarian company, Over-
gas Inc. (50% Gazprom, 50% Overgas Holding, with a non-transparent ownership structure), 
which supplies approximately 2.5 billion m3 of gas annually; (b) the Russian-German company, 
WIEE (50% Gazprom, 50% Wintershall), which supplies on average 0.5 billion m3 of gas an-
nually; and (c) Gazpromexport, which supplies small quantities of ‘technical gas’ for the needs 
of transit. Gazprom also has access to gas sales through Overgas Inc., which directly carries 
out approximately 10% of the supplies to end users in Bulgaria. The existing gas connections 
between Bulgaria and its neighbours – the interconnectors with Romania, Turkey, Greece and 
Macedonia – are elements of Bratstvo transit pipeline used to transport Russian gas. 
Bulgaria imports on average 8 million 
tonnes of oil and petroleum products an-
nually. The vast majority of the imports 
comes from Russia (approximately 85%). 
The Russian corporation, LUKoil is the key 
player on the Bulgarian oil market, whose 
subsidiary (LUKoil Bulgaria) is one of the 
largest firms in Bulgaria. LUKoil controls 
Neftechim Burgas, the only refinery in 
Bulgaria and the largest one in the Balkans (its annual capacity is 9.5 million tonnes of 
oil), and the Rosenets oil terminal (capable of receiving 10 million tonnes of oil annually). 
LUKoil also has a share of approximately 25% in the Bulgarian fuel sale market owing to 
the development of its filling station chain. 
Russia also plays a major role in the Bulgarian nuclear sector. The Kozloduy nuclear power 
plant, the only one currently operating in the country, was built with the use of Russian techno-
logies. Nuclear fuel is supplied by Russia’s TWEL, which in 2006 extended the supply contract 
for the next 20 years. Russian companies are also participating in the construction of the new 
nuclear power plant in Belene. According to an initial agreement, Russia’s Rosatom is to be 
among the shareholders of the new power plant. Additionally, Rosatom’s subsidiary, Atomstroy-
export (ASE), won a tender and signed in 2008 a contract to build Belene NPP. 
Bulgaria on the Russian energy policy map
Bulgaria, due to its strategic geographical location, is an important country to Russia. 
The southern branch of the transit gas pipeline, Bratstvo, which transports annually aro-
und 14 billion m3 of gas to Turkey, around 3 billion m3 to Greece and minor amounts to 
Macedonia, runs through Bulgarian territory. Thus transit via Bulgaria accounts for almost 
15% of Russian gas exports to non-CIS countries. Three strategic – from Russia’s point of 
view – energy projects, the South Stream (SS) gas pipeline, the Burgas–Alexandroupolis 
(BA) oil pipeline and the Belene nuclear power plant, are also located in Bulgaria (see Map). 
One of the aims of the SS and BA projects is to reduce Russia’s dependence on other trans-
it countries, Ukraine and Turkey. They also are an important tool used in Russian energy 
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policy abroad because promoting these projects is making the prospects for the completion 
of competitive projects more complicated, such as the Nabucco gas pipeline and the Con-
stanta–Trieste or Odessa–Brody oil pipelines. 
The Belene nuclear power plant project is important to Russia mainly for commercial re-
asons. The implementation of this investment will bring significant financial benefits to the 
Russian nuclear industry. The contracts signed with Russia’s ASE alone is worth 4 billion 
euros, which is several times more than the estimated construction costs of the Bulgarian 
sections of the SS or BA pipelines. However, this investment can also be seen in a strategic 
context. This would be the first nuclear power plant to have been built from the ground 
up by Russia on the EU market since the 1990s (the nuclear power plants presently ope-
rating in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were built with the use of Russian 
technologies in the 1980s). A failure of the Belene project would come as a serious blow 
to the Russian nuclear industry on the EU market and would significantly impede Russia’s 
expansion into the electric energy market in South-Eastern Europe. 
A new vision for Bulgaria’s energy policy?
Russian-Bulgarian relations have cooled significantly since the gas crisis at the beginning 
of 2009. They became even colder after the centre-right party, Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria (GERB), led by Boyko Borisov came to power in July 2009 partly 
because the prime minister announced the need to revise existing energy deals with Russia. 
The Borisov-led government proclaimed a discontinuation of the policy of their predeces-
sor, the centre-left cabinet of Sergei Stanishev, who was a staunch supporter of enhancing 
Bulgarian-Russian energy co-operation. Despite the increasingly commonly seen friction in 
relations with Russia and the rhetoric being used by the ruling class in Bulgaria, it is still 
difficult to speak of a deep change in Bulgaria’s energy policy. Firstly, the government is not 
withdrawing support for the Russian projects. Its policy is ‘playing on many different pianos’, 
i.e. offering support to all energy projects without being certain of which of them will be 
finally implemented. This policy is basical-
ly no different from the one the previous 
centre-left cabinet led by Sergei Stanishev 
was pursuing, as they officially suppor-
ted not only the Russian projects but 
also the competitive projects for building 
the Nabucco gas pipeline or the AMBO 
(Bulgaria – Macedonia – Albania) oil pipeline. 
Secondly, the Borisov-led government, 
like the preceding governments, supports the development of the nuclear energy sector. 
The national energy strategy adopted in early June 2011 (covering a timeframe until 2020) 
emphasises the need to extend the period of operation of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant 
(the two last reactors are to be decommissioned by the end of 2017 and 2019) and to in-
crease the output of the nuclear energy sector by 2,000 MW. This is to be achieved either 
by building an additional two reactors at the Kozloduy power plant or the construction of 
a new power plant in Belene1.
However, the change which has taken place in Bulgaria’s energy policy is the intensification of 
efforts to improve the country’s gas security. Therefore, the turning point in Bulgarian energy 
policy happened not when the centre-right came to power but after the gas crisis at the be-
ginning of 2009. The reserves released at that time were definitely insufficient to satisfy the 
demand for gas during the break in supplies from Russia, which lasted almost three weeks. 
Supplies from other countries were low (a total of 3 million m3 of gas from Greece) and were 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1	 Енергийна	Стратегия	на	
Република	България	до	2020	г., 
Държавен	Вестник,	Брой 43, 
7	Юни	2011	г.,	page	13.
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made after lengthy preparations. Although Bulgaria has connections with Romania, Greece, 
Turkey and Macedonia, which are part of the transit infrastructure used to transport Russian 
gas, it was unable to obtain gas in the necessary amounts. The Bulgarian government has 
definitely intensified efforts to improve the country’s energy security since then. 
Since the beginning of 2009, Bulgaria has entered into initial agreements for building gas 
interconnectors with Greece, Romania, Turkey and Serbia. The greatest progress has been 
made in the construction of the interconnector with Romania (Ruse–Giurgiu), which is to 
be put into operation by the end of 2012. Its flow capacity is to reach 0.5 billion m3 annu-
ally and can be raised to 1.5 billion m3. In turn, the gas interconnector with Greece (Stara 
Zagora – Komotini), which is to be put into operation by the end of 2013, would give Bul-
garia access to the planned Turkey – Greece – Italy (TGI) gas pipeline. The high flow capa-
city of the planned Bulgarian-Greek interconnector (3 billion m3 with a possibility of being 
increased to 5 billion m3 annually) indicates that it could be used in the future to transport 
Caspian gas through Bulgaria to South-Eastern and Central Europe. This idea fits in with 
the Southern Corridor concept, which is aimed at enabling Caspian gas supplies to Europe. 
At the same time, Sofia is making intensive efforts to obtain gas supplies from Azerbaijan. 
This concerns both representatives of the government led by Boyko Borisov and President 
Georgi Pyrvanov, who is linked to the post-Communist team, both of whom are engaged 
in frequent contacts with representatives of Turkey and Azerbaijan. According to the Bulga-
rian energy minister, Traiko Traikov, Bulgaria will receive 1 billion m3 of gas from Azerbaijan 
annually, starting in 2014. However, no binding contracts have been signed as yet. 
Borisov’s government is also pinning a lot of hope on the possibilities of producing dome-
stic shale gas and is favourably disposed to 
foreign companies which specialise in the 
exploration of shale gas and testing pro-
duction possibilities. Several exploration 
licences have been granted so far to three 
firms: Chevron (this firm estimates that 
the deposits in the Novi Pazar block may 
contain even 1 trillion m3 of gas), Direct 
Petroleum Exploration (this firm announced 
in November 2010 that it had found depo-
sits reaching 300 billion m3) from the US, 
and the Canadian company, Park Place Energy. The government has also promised to hold more 
tenders for shale gas exploration. Shale gas production as an opportunity for improving energy 
security is envisaged in the governmental energy strategy. However, this has raised strong 
objections among the opposition, especially the post-Communist Bulgarian Socialist Party. 
The game for gas – the beginning 
of the end of the Russian monopoly?
Disputes between Sofia and Moscow in the area of gas concern both the conditions of the 
contracts which set gas supply rules, and the South Stream gas pipeline project. Bulgaria 
above all wants a lower gas purchase price and supplies directly from Gazprom. This lack of 
agents is expected to decrease the price and provide Bulgaria with an increased possibility 
to claim its rights should there be cuts in supplies2. In turn, Russia wants Bulgaria to keep 
its share in the SS project and is trying to obtain the best possible conditions for the imple-
mentation of this project, for example, demanding the inclusion of the Bulgarian transport 
infrastructure in the project. 
2 In response to Sofia’s compla-
ints about the overly high price 
of the gas supplied, representa-
tives of Gazprom disclosed 
that the price in July 2010 
was US$ 339 for 1000 m3. 
They also admitted that the 
gas sale price to end users 
in Bulgaria was surprisingly 
high (it was then US$ 576 
for 1000 m3). 
However, the change which has taken 
place in Bulgaria’s energy policy is 
the intensification of efforts to improve 
the country’s gas security. Therefore, 
the turning point in Bulgarian energy 
policy happened not when the centre- 
-right came to power but after the gas 
crisis at the beginning of 2009. 
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Bulgaria is trying to capitalise on its significance in the SS project to be offered the best 
possible gas supply conditions. This can be concluded from Sofia’s delaying the establish-
ment of a company for the implementation of the Bulgarian section of SS and also from 
the way gas negotiations were conducted in July 2010. On 17 July, Bulgargaz and Gazprom 
signed a letter of intent in Varna envisaging a reduction of the gas price in a future contract 
and the withdrawal of agent companies, and an intergovernmental agreement on a ‘road 
map’ for the implementation of the SS gas pipeline in Bulgaria was signed on the same day. 
This document provided for the quick establishment of a company in charge of building 
the Bulgarian section of the pipeline, which took place in November 2010. It also included 
a provision stating that transit of Russian gas via Bulgarian gas pipelines at the level of 
17 billion m3 annually would be retained. This was to dispel Sofia’s fears that Russia will 
want to incorporate part of Bulgaria’s transport networks into the SS project, thus reducing 
its costs. Russians would thus gain significant influence on the management of Bulgaria’s 
transport infrastructure. 
The deadline for signing a new gas project 
as envisaged under the Varna deal expired 
in July 2011. It can be concluded from 
statements given by representatives of 
both firms that the parties have been una-
ble to reach a compromise over a number 
of issues, such as gas price or quantity. 
The Bulgarian government has also wi-
thdrawn from its intention to sign a ten-
year contract and has declared its readi-
ness to sign a contract for a shorter term. 
The toughening of Bulgaria’s stance and the 
overly long negotiation process are proba-
bly an effect of the ever closer perspective for the implementation of diversification projects, 
which is improving Bulgaria’s negotiating position. However, it has to be emphasised that 
the scope and the intensity of Bulgaria’s diversification efforts indicates that diversification 
is for Bulgaria a goal per se, and not only an element of pressure to obtain the best possi-
ble conditions of gas supply from Russia. However, while choosing diversification, Bulgaria 
is likely to pay very high prices of Russian gas in the transition period, i.e. while the inter-
connectors with its neighbours are being built (2012–2014).
The game for the atom – a question of money
The dispute between Sofia and Moscow in the nuclear sector is focused on the issue 
of financing the Belene nuclear power plant. It is an effect of numerous irregularities 
which have taken place throughout the whole process of the management of the project. 
The investment commenced with no reliable economic analyses having been prepared; nor 
had financing sources been guaranteed or determined. An agreement with the strategic 
investor, which was supposed to find financing sources for the project, was signed almost 
a year after the binding power plant construction contract was concluded. 
The Bulgarian National Electric Company (NEK) already in January 2008 concluded 
a contract for the construction of two WWER 1000 type reactors and construction work at 
the power plant with Russian Atomstroyexport (ASE), while the contract with the strategic 
investor, Germany’s RWE, was signed as late as November 2008. It soon turned out that 
the contract with ASE was imprecisely defined and allowed Russian company to increase 
the construction costs significantly (it was not stated precisely, whether the contract value 
Bulgaria is trying to capitalise 
on its significance in the SS project 
to be offered the best possible 
gas supply conditions. 
However, while choosing 
diversification, Bulgaria is likely to pay 
very high prices of Russian gas 
in the transition period, i.e. while 
the interconnectors with its neighbours 
are being built (2012–2014).
i s s u e  6 1  |  0 5 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 1  |  C e n t r e  f o r  e a s t e r n  s t u d i e s
Commentaryosw
OSW.WAW.PL 6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Shareholders of TransBalkan 
Pipeline: 51% – Russia’s 
Transneft, Gazpromneft 
and Rosneft; 
24.5% – Greece’s Helpe 
Tarki AE and the Greek 
Treasury, 24.5% – Bulgaria’s 
state-controlled Project 
Company Oil Pipeline Burgas- 
-Alexandroupolis – BG.
is to be indexed according to the inflation rate in Russia or in Bulgaria). ASE insists that 
the price of the power plant will be a minimum of 6.3 billion euros, while NEK is ready to 
accept 5 billion euros. The companies have been unable to agree on the way of setting the 
final value of the contract for more than 3 years now. 
RWE’s withdrawal from the project has made the situation even more complicated. Sofia 
used this to freeze the investment and to re-launch the procedure evaluating the invest-
ment’s cost-efficiency. Although the Bulgarian side agreed for Russia’s Rosatom to replace 
RWE as the strategic investor (pursuant to the letter of intent of November 2010, it was 
to acquire 49% of the shares in the power plant at the most), but at the same time it 
turned down a 2 billion euro loan offered by the Russian side to finance the investment. 
The Bulgarian government has emphasi-
sed that a decision concerning the con-
tinuation of the investment will be taken 
when a new financial analysis of the pro-
ject has been made and a Western so-
urce of financing is found. This met with 
a negative reaction from Russia, a sign of 
which was a court suit brought by ASE against NEK in July 2011. The Russian company 
demanded 58 million euros as due payment for part of the work carried out by it. The suit 
was a sign that Moscow was ready to claim its rights in court, which was to convince Sofia 
to decide to continue the construction. 
The disputes over the Belene nuclear power plant prove that Russia wants to implement 
this investment on the best possible financial conditions. The Russian side, threatening to 
launch damage-claiming procedures, is trying to force its Bulgarian partners to take a posi-
tive decision regarding this investment. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian stance on this issue is not 
obvious. For Bulgaria, this investment is important from the point of view of the realisation 
of its ambition to gain a strong position as an electricity exporter, which would provide 
a source of significant income and reinforce the country’s position in the region. The activity 
of a strong Bulgarian nuclear industry lobby, which includes not only NEK but also nume-
rous technological and consulting firms, should also not be disregarded. However, on the 
other hand, Sofia is delaying the completion of this investment in an attempt to negotiate 
the best possible financial conditions. It has also been facing such objective difficulties as 
the shortage of funds and doubts about the investment’s cost-efficiency. The government 
led by Boyko Borisov has announced that the decision to either continue or discontinue 
the investment will be passed after the presidential and local elections in October 2011.
Games in the oil sector 
The disputes in the oil sector so far have mainly concerned the future of the Burgas–
Alexandroupolis (BA) oil pipeline. Russia has been making attempts to force Bulgaria to 
make a positive decision concerning this investment, indicating that it can replace it with 
another project, the Samsun–Ceyhan pipeline running through Turkey. When Borisov and 
his team formed the government, Bulgaria withdrew political support from this investment. 
The main reason why the Bulgarian government disliked the project was to meet the expec-
tations of Bulgarian public and tourist business halfway, who were very critical about this 
project. Sofia started delaying transfers of funds to the TransBalkan Pipeline3, the company 
in charge of implementation of this investment, and giving negative opinions on the envi-
ronmental impact studies prepared by the company. This strategy brought the expected 
results. In September, Russia’s Transneft announced it would be freezing this project, which 
can be understood as a form of tacit withdrawal from this investment. 
The investment commenced with no 
reliable economic analyses having been 
prepared; nor had financing sources 
been guaranteed or determined.
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A new reason for friction has emerged, namely the rule of operation of the Russian compa-
ny LUKoil in Bulgaria. In July this year, the Bulgarian Customs Office cancelled the licen-
ce for oil import to the Neftechim Burgas refinery and the Rosenets oil terminal, both of 
which are controlled by LUKoil. The official reason was another delay in installing measure-
ment devices necessary to precisely calculate the excise duty to be imposed, depending on 
the quantity of imported oil. Six days later, the administrative court in Sofia invalidated 
the Customs Agency’s decision because it led to irreversible losses for LUKoil Bulgaria and 
posed a threat to the public interest (the Burgas refinery is the only supplier of aviation fuel 
in Bulgaria and implements a number of contracts signed with state-controlled compa-
nies). Despite the favourable court decision, the company is still facing a lot of problems. 
The Bulgarian competition protection office launched an investigation in August in connec-
tion with price conspiracy suspicions, where LUKoil is the main suspect. 
Sofia has entered into dispute with LUKoil 
in order to curb non-transparent practices 
on the fuel market. However, the actions 
taken give rise to a number of suspicions 
that the government might have been 
politically motivated while taking them. 
For example, it is unclear why the Customs 
Office applied this very strict sanction of 
licence cancellation instead of imposing 
a fine. The sudden launch of the investi-
gation against LUKoil by the Antitrust Office also seem dubious. The government and even 
LUKoil to a certain extent have benefited from the temporary confusion about the func-
tioning of the refinery. The governing party, GERB, has reinforced its image as a grouping 
determined to enforce the law and struggling against the unpopular corporation (numerous 
protests due to high fuel prices have taken place in 2011). Prime Minister Borisov has also 
cut short any speculation about the powerful informal influence the head of LUKoil Bulgaria, 
Valentin Zlatev, reportedly has. This may be very important during the local and presidential 
elections this October. In turn, LUKoil has moved the dispute to court, thus gaining time to 
install the measurement devices. 
Possible scenarios
Russia and Bulgaria’s energy co-operation covers projects of regional and European signifi-
cance. Therefore, the prospects for the implementation of large energy projects do not de-
pend solely on aspects of how Bulgarian-Russian relations develop. The impact of the global 
economic crisis, which will be adversely affecting the possibility of implementing common 
projects in the energy sector, should also be taken into account. 
The experiences of the gas crisis and the process of liberalisation and integration of the gas 
markets within the EU have certainly provided a strong stimulus for redefining Bulgarian- 
-Russian gas relations. New possibilities related to the production of shale gas are opening 
up in Bulgaria. The construction of a section of the Southern Corridor, which is to facilitate 
the transport of Caspian gas to South-Eastern and Central European countries, in Bulgarian 
territory is increasingly likely. Therefore, there is a real chance to reduce Bulgaria’s very high 
dependence on Russian gas supplies. The need to ensure gas supplies before the new inter-
connectors are put into operation, which will take at least the next two years, is weakening 
Sofia’s position while negotiating the new gas contracts. The dependence on Russian gas 
supplies may only be expected to be reduced in the medium term. Although it is difficult to 
say now what the future of South Stream will be, if a strong will for its implementation is de-
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monstrated by the states and the companies participating in this project, Sofia will not block 
this investment. 
A resolution of the dispute over the future of the Belene nuclear power plant, which may 
define the character if Russian-Bulgarian co-operation in this sector, seems to be much 
closer. The traditions of nuclear co-operation, the non-transparent decision-making process 
and the activity of strong nuclear lobbies in both countries may decide in advance that the 
investment will be implemented. Whatever the future of this project, Russia and Bulgaria 
are very likely to establish closer co-operation in the nuclear sector. The Bulgarian govern-
ment is planning to extend the period of operation of the present nuclear power plant in 
Kozloduy, which was built with the use of Russian technologies. 
No major change in the nature of co-operation in the fuel sector should be expected. 
Everything seems to indicate that the Burgas–Alexandroupolis oil pipeline will not be built, 
and Russia will remain the main supplier of fuel for Bulgaria. Although further frictions be-
tween the Bulgarian government and Russia’s LUKoil cannot be ruled out, the company will 
still be a powerful player on the Bulgarian fuel market.
Energy balance of Bulgaria in 2009
Data in thousands of tonnes of oil equivalent 
Gross inland 
consumption
Primary 
production
Imports Exports
Coal 6319 4560 1702 5
Gas 2162 13 2131 -
Oil and petroleum products 4364 25 7828 3166
Renewables and geothermal energy 794 752 - -
Electricity from renewable sources (pumped-
storage excluded)
318 318 - 32
Nuclear energy 3878 3878 - -
Heat 42 42 - -
Electricity -436 - 229 665
Total 17482 9588 11939 3868
Source: National Statistical Institute (NSI) 
a p p e n d i x
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